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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to provide evidences in 
context of life cycle and free cash flow theories. The study 
examines the potential factors of firms to pay dividend by 
conducting logistic regression with sample of 138 firms 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2010 till 
2015. The result of analysis shows that dividend payers 
generally are firms at mature stage which is consistent 
with life cycle theory. Also, these mature firms normally 
are larger firms, more profitable, higher earnings, higher 
debt and diminish for investment opportunities. In 
addition, the higher debt for dividend payers indicates the 
existence of free cash flow effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Dividend policy is one of the most controversial topic for study of finance. Its concern 
with determining the size and pattern of distributions (Baker and Weigand, 2015) 
and the decision to pay dividend or not (Black, 1976). In fact, it is difficult to determine 
the factors which have effect for dividend payout. Some researches in finance have 
engaged in extensive theorizing to explain, others have developed and tested various 
models and some researchers have surveyed the views by managers and institutional 
investors about dividend (Baker and Powell, 1999).  Gordon (1959) suggests that 
dividend as an important determinant for the firm value. But, the seminal paper of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) provide evidence that dividend has no effect on determining 
market valuation of the firm, based on perfect and frictionless capital market 
assumptions.  
Firm value depends sole on distribution of future cash flows. Moreover, irrelevance 
propositions imply that investment policy can be regarded separable from dividend 
decisions. This result supports the empirical finding by Black and Scholes (1974) and 
Miller and Scholes (1982) which suggest that no significant relation between stock 
returns and dividend yield or dividend payout. Baker and Smith (2006) point out that 
some research appear not in line with dividend irrelevance proposition, they suggest  
that dividend policy is important to shareholders because it can affect share prices and 
the wealth of shareholders under modified perfect market assumptions. The work by 
Baker and Powell (1999) support the finding that dividend policy does matter. The 
debate of irrelavance theory arise from the assumptions of perfect capital market, 
because in the real world, market imperfections exist. For instance Black (1976), 
proposes the dividend puzzle who emphasizes explanation why firms pay dividend and 
why investors want it. 
The controversial paper by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) argue that dividends payout 
and investment policy are both directly affect the firm value. Irrelevance theorem restrict 
payouts to an optimum, which is why only investment policy affects firm value. 
Moreover, Poterba and Summers, (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), Fama, (1980), Jensen 
and Meckling (1986), Baker and Wurgler (2004a), and Baker and Wurgler (2004b) who 
explain that dividend exist focusing either on market frictions or imperfections, such as 
taxes, asymmetric information or signaling effect, and agency costs or on behavioral 
considerations, such as investor preferences. 
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The objective of this study is to examines the relation between size, retained earnings to 
total assets, return on total assets, debt to total assets and price to book value and 
dividend policy. Furthermore, to find the characteristics of dividend payers and non 
dividend payers in the contex of life cycle and free cash flow theories. 
The structures of this study are organized as follows: Section II presents a review of the 
relevant literatures, the evidence on the determinants of propensity to pay.Section III 
describes the dataset, sample selection and the method used by this study. Section IV 
examines and discusses about some determinants for dividend payment by implication 
of theories for dividend policy and finally, and Section V concludes the study. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEWS 
2.1. Free cash flow theory of dividend 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory is an expanded of risk sharing 
problem among individual and groups, this problem arises when cooperating parties, 
principal and agent  have different attitudes toward risk. In other study, Ross (1973) 
propose that the agency relationship arisen between agent and principal, which agent 
acts on behalf for principal. But, there is a loss of utility for the principal because of 
information asymmetrically held by manager. The seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), suggest  that the main problem of agency relationship is on the agents decision 
itself, which is divergence to welfare of principal. Fama (1980) describes role of 
management as manager and risk bearer, with special role as the decision making. Thus, 
the risk averse behavior of managers will choose to conclude the uncertainty in the 
evaluation performance and tend to avoid any risk discount in his performance. In other 
research, Fama and Jensen (1983) examined the issue of separation of ownership and 
control. In addition, the agency problem arise because of conflicting interest between 
principal and agent. Hill and Jones (1992) suggest that divergence of interests between 
managers and stockholders is show up while stockholders are wealth maximizers and 
managers maximize a utility function. Recently, Pepper and Gore (2015) propose 
reconceptualization of agency theory, by modified the model of economic man, but the 
central issue of agency problem is still conflict interest of agents and principals.  
Several mechanisme for controling the agency problems proposed by some researchers. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that principals can mitigate agency costs by establishing 
appropriate incentive contracts and by incurring monitoring costs. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), increasing the firm ownership of the managers decreases 
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managerial opportunism. Fama (1980) describe the information effects of efficient 
capital and labor markets on managerial opportunism, which managers face disipline 
and opportunities provided by their services, both within and outside the firm, while the 
firms is disciplined by competition form other firms.  Fama and Jensen (1983) describe 
that separation of decision and risk bearing function is effective common approach to 
controlling the implied agency problem, while the board of directors  plays the role of the 
internal monitor and stock market is an external monitoring devise. Recently, Pepper and 
Gore (2015) argue that the interests of shareholders and their agents are most likely to 
be aligned if executives are motivated to perform to the best of their abilities. 
Higgins (1972) argues that dividend and investment needs are interdependent, firms 
need funds for future investment  and the selection of a dividend saving program to 
finance these needs at minimum cost. Jensen (1986) argues that investment required 
excess of free cash flow to fund all projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital, but managers tend to invest the free cash flow 
on unprofitable investment project rather then payout the exccess resources to 
shareholders.   
Easterbrook (1984) points out that the role of dividend as the method of aligning 
managers interest with those of investors, where dividends may keep firms in the capital 
market with lower cost and may be useful in adjusting the level of risk taken by managers. 
Rozeff (1982) suggests that sum of agency cost and transactions costs determines an 
optimal dividend payout. Moreover, investment policy influences dividend policy, which 
firms with higher investment as measured by current and prospective growth rates of 
revenues have lower dividend payouts. According  to Jensen (1986) that the conflict 
centres around the use of free cash flow by manager, dividend policy helps the firms to 
alleviate the agency problems, by paying dividends to the shareholder can reduce 
managerial control over the resources. Another research, Lie (2000) suggests that 
disbursements of funds to shareholders can mitigate the potential overinvestments by 
managers associated with excess fund. 
2.2.Life cycle theory of the firm 
The overall process of organization development and growing the organizations move 
through developmental phases into growth level, Greiner (1972). Scott and Bruce (1987) 
propose model of firm development, which consists of five steps : inception, which 
necessity for generating profit in order to survive; survival, where financing emphasis 
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swing to working capital and finance increased inventories and receivables; growth, 
which firm unlikely to generate cash for owner; expansion, which retained earnings are 
still major form of finance dividends; maturity, which firms have sufficient earnings but 
need long term debt necessary. The study of Berger and Udell (1998) used financial 
growth cycle paradigm to analyze the economics small business finance and the private 
equity and debt markets in which these businesses raise funds. The result show that the 
different sources of small business finance are interconnected through reference to the 
growth cycle paradigm. Moreover, Dickinson (2011) develops a firm life cycle proxy using 
cash flow patterns, and find that the market valuation cosequences of life cycle are 
investigated and it its demonstrated that positive future excess retuns can be earned for 
firms that fall into the mature phase. 
The life cycle theory stated that dividend tend to be paid by mature firms because they 
have higher profitability and fewer investment opportunities whereas young firms have 
abundant investment opportunities thus make them retention the dividend DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2006). Some researches implement the life cycle on dividend policy 
with growth opportunities and retained earnings to total equity and retained earnings to 
total assets as the proksi. Fama and French (2001) observe a trend that firms with 
negative retained earnings show no change in their propensity to pay dividend, while 
those whose earned equity makes them candidates to pay dividends. Moreover, 
companies with low profitability, small size and strong growth opportunities tend to be 
companies that never paid dividends. Grullon,  Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) suggest 
that increases in dividends convey information about changes in firm’s life cycle, thus 
dividend increases and other cash payouts follow through firms undergoes as it moves 
from growth phase to mature phase, this manifest itself in declining rate of reinvestment, 
declining return on investment and growth rates. Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu (2007) 
argue that dividend initiators are large firms with high profitability cash balances and low 
growth rates, while systematic risk does not change significantly around initiations. 
DeAngelo, Deangelo and Stulz (2006) examine the life cycle of publicly traded industrial 
firm and point out that decision to pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a 
large portion of total equity and total assets and falls to near zero when most equity is 
contributed rather than earned. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) combines a life cycle 
theory and agency theory, with firms investment opportunity set as their proxy for the 
firms life cycle stage, it implies that firms in early lifetime stages tend to avoid payouts 
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contrary in mature stages, firm should pay dividends and repurchase stock, because 
generate ample cash internally and their investment opportunities have faded. 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Both the free cash flow and life cycle theories posit that, compared with smaller firms, 
larger firms with higher total assets indicate the firms is in mature stage, and have higher 
free cash flow (Thanatawee, 2011). Fama and French (2001) confirmed that the key 
variables of dividend payers are size, profitability, and investment opportunities. They 
have larger size, more profitable and lower investment opportunities. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) find that size is the determinant of the desison to pay 
dividends. The result by Denis and Osobov (2008) find that the propensity to paying 
dividend is associated with firm size as posited by Fama and French (2001) and Denis 
and Osobov (2008). Recently, Thanatawee (2011) confirmed that larger firms tend to 
pay higher dividend payout ratio and dividend yield, based on the characterisics of the 
firms, as payers and non payers. Thus size a proxy for life cycle and free cash flow is 
predicted to have a positive relation with dividend payment. 
Ha1 : firm size has significant effect to dividend payment 
Firms with higher profitability have more able to generate free cash flopay ws, it makes 
them candidat to pay dividend (Thanatawee, 2011).  Fama and French (2001) find that 
profitability has significant effect to dividend payments which implies if the firms are 
more profitable then they shall increase their dividends to shareholders, thus firm with 
high profitability has high ability for dividend increase. The result by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) confirmed that distribution of dividend by firms are 
positively significant relate with profitability, indicate that profitability is strong 
determinant of the decisions to pay dividend. Denis and Osobov (2008) confirm that the 
likelihood of paying dividends is positively related to profitability. This study cast doubt 
on dividend signaling that stated that dividend payers are newly listed firm and less 
profitable.Thanatawee (2011) finds that firms with more retained earnings are more 
likely to pay dividends. Moreover, Fairchild, Guney and Thanatawee (2014) reveal that 
firms with higher profits tend to pay higher dividend which is support the free cash flow 
theory. The findings by Grullon,  Michaely and Swaminathan, (2002) show that profit 
decrease after a dividend increase and profits by dividend decreasing firms have 
tendency to increase. Thus, free cash flow hypothesis predict a positive relation between 
profitability and dividend payment. 
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Ha2 : profitability has significant effect to dividend 
Consistent with life cycle theory, DeAngelo, Deangelo and Stulz (2006) find significant 
association between earned/contributed capital as measured by ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity, ratio of retained earnings to total assets and dividend policies. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) test the life cycle theory to explain whether the 
probability to pay dividend is related to the earned/contributed capital mix, and find that 
retained earnings to total equity, retained earnings to total assets as their proxies for the 
firm’s life cycle stage have stronger impact on the decision to pay dividend. Thus, free cash 
flow hypothesis predict a positive relation between earnings and dividend payment.  
Ha3 : earnings has significant effect to dividend 
Easterbrook (1984) suggests that the second source of agentcy cost is risk aversion of 
managers, the personal wealth of managers dependent on firms, if the firms performance 
poorly or go bankrupt, the managers will lose their job, managers there for will be choose 
the projects that are safe for their wealth, this concern arise from personal risk aversion. 
Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) find that dividend payout and dividend yield of leverage 
firms than in all equity firms. Thus, Jensen, (1986) finds that dividends and debt are 
subtitute mechanisms for controlling the agency costs. Thanatawee (2011) the result 
shows that the financial leverage have negative influences on dividend payout, whereas 
firms with more debt pay lower dividend.  Thus, free cash flow hypothesis predict a 
negative relation between leverage and dividend payment. The result of Budiarso and 
Pontoh (2015) show that firms as dividend payers who in mature phase are firms with 
age below 33 years, have lower debt, larger size, and better profitable, this result in line 
with life cycle theory. Thus, life cycle and free cash flow hypothesis predict a positive 
relation between leverage and dividend payment. 
Ha4 : leverage has significant effect to dividend 
Trade off evolves over life a firm’s life cycle result diversity ability to generate cash 
internally and in its scale of profitability opportunities, in consequences, in their early 
life cycle stages, firms have scarce profitable projects and less ability to generate funds 
internally, and so they tend to retention dividend, whereas, mature firms pay dividends 
and repurchase stock because of lower amount of cash and their investment 
opportunities tend to shrinking. Thanatawee (2011) examines the relationship of 
growth opportunities and dividend payouts, and find that market to book ratio is 
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significantly positive, contradicts the finding by Fama and French (2001) and Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992). Moreover, Fairchild, Guney and Thanatawee (2014) show that 
the market to book ratio has a significant effect to dividend decreases which indicate that 
firms with higher investment opportunities tend to pay lower dividend. According to 
Grullon,  Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) the dividend increases and other cash 
payout are the process from growth phase to mature phase. Thus, firms become mature 
their investment opportunity set become smaller. Thus, life cycle and free cash flow 
hypothesis predict a negative relation between leverage and dividend payment. 
 Ha5 : investment opportunities has significant effect to dividend 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study uses audited financial statement of listed firms as the sample in period of 2010 
to 2015 which is provided by Indonesia Stock Exchange. Table 1 presents the detail of the 
sample for this study. 
Table 1. Samples 
Sectors Samples (Firms) 
Agriculture 54 
Mining   78 
Basic Industry & Chemicals 186 
Miscellaneous Industry 108 
Consumer Goods Industry   96 
Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation   72 
Trade, Service, Investment 234 
Total 828 
 
This study divides the sample into two clusters according to their propensity to pay 
dividend, which are firms as dividend payers and firms as non payers. The dividend 
payers are the firms who pay their dividend on average more or equal Rp 1, while non 
dividend payers are the firms who pay their dividend on average below Rp 1. On these 
categories, the dependent variable of this study are 1 for dividend payers and 0 for non 
dividend payers. The study conducts binary logistic regression as the method of analysis 
in term to test the hypothesis. Based on variables presented in Table 2, this study 
construct the regression model as follow: 
 
Ddummy  = α + βSize + βROA + βRETA + βDAR + βPBV +  ε 
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Table 2. Definitions of variables 
Variables Definition 
Firm size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets 
Earnings (RETA) Ratio of retained earnings to total assets 
Debt (DAR) Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Investment opportunities (PBV) Ratio of market value to book value of 
equity 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for explanatory variables of the regression model. 
Descriptive statistics shows that dividend payers have considerably greater mean value 
of size (15.3416), return on assets (0.1028), retained earnings to total assets (0.3223), 
and price to book value (13.4651) rather than non payers. This results indicate that 
dividend payers are firms with larger of total assets and more profitable, which is 
consistent with Fama and French (2002). Still consistent with Fama and French (2002), 
since these firms have larger ratio of retained earning to total assets, then it indicates 
they have larger funds to make them have more probability to pay dividends and 
financing their projects with internal funds and less external funds as showed by small 
debt ratio. In addition, these firm indicates have large investment opportunities as they 
have higher ratio of market value to book value of equity. 
Otherwise, the non payers tend to have smaller size and lower profitability concern with 
the total assets they have. The lower retained earnings to total assets indicates these 
firms have less probability to pay dividends to their shareholders. The higher debt to 
assets ratio indicates these firms are using large leverage to finance their projects. 
According to Bonaimé, Öztekin and Warr (2014), debt ratio over than 50% could be 
classified as higher debt. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 Payers  Non Payers 
 Minimum Maximum Mean  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Size       11.40      19.32 15.3416      9.43 17.31 13.9401 
ROA       -0.16       0.76   0.1028        -1.28       3.47     0.0168 
RETA       -0.94       1.33   0.3223      -26.74       1.80 -0.4347 
DAR        0.10       2.12   0.4655         0.00       5.03 0.5700 
PBV -1421.34 1193.89 13.4651  -2836.37 52268.11 257.6051 
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Table 4 presents results of logit regression analysis to examine relationship between 
dividend policy and its independent variables. The results report that all independent 
variables have significant effects to dependent variable, which means Ha1, Ha2, Ha3, and 
Ha4 are accepted. The results indicate that firms as dividend payers relative to firms as non 
dividend payers have strong tendency to follow life cycle theory and indicate have free 
cash flow effect. 
Table 4. Logistic regression of dividend payers and non dividend payers 
 Dividend payers Non dividend payers 
Constant -6.290 6.290 
Size 0.524* -0.524* 
ROA 7.513* -7.513* 
RETA 6.633* -6.633* 
DAR 1.283* -1.283* 
PBV -0.310* 0.310* 
*significant at 5% 
 
4.1. Firm as dividend payers 
The results in table 4 shows that size, return on assets, retained earnings to total assets 
and debt to total assets are positively significant, while those on price to book value are 
negatively significant. These finding suggest that firms with larger size, more 
profitability, higher retained earnings to total assets, higher debt to total assets, and 
lower price to book value tend to pay dividend. These results tend to follow life cycle 
theory. The positive effect for size, return on assets, and negative effect for price to book 
value are in line with Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006). 
They suggest that characteristics of dividend payers are larger size, higher profitability, 
and less investment opportunities. Moreover, the dividend payers tend to have higher 
retained earnings to total assets as posed by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) and 
non payers the reverse. 
Firm size, return on assets, and retained earnings to total assets have a significant positive 
impact on dividend payment, which is consistent with Fama and French (2001), Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), Denis and 
Osobov (2008), Thanatawee (2011), and Fairchild, Guney and Thanatawee (2014) in 
context of life cycle theory. They conclude that firms with higher size, more profitable, 
higher retained earnings and less investment opportunities are firms in mature phase and 
have tendency to pay dividend. The higher return on assets indicates these firms manage 
their assets efficiently in purpose to generate profit. Thus, table 4 provides the results of 
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logistic regression and shows that dividend payers have a higher ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets. Its indicate, these firms are able to accumulate their profit for over 
time which make them have capability to pay dividends. Also, more profitable the firms 
then will expand their business and become more larger which give them higher 
profitability as well as their size. In addition, the negative coefficient for price to book 
value indicate that these firms have abundant investment opportunity.  
Furthermore, the higher debt ratio shows these firms are using larger external financing 
even it in mature phase. This indicate that internal resources of these firms are limited to 
exploit the large investment project and to pay dividend to shareholder. This make them 
to rely on external financing resources. Also, in relation to price to book value, the result 
provided negative relation between the market to book ratio and leverage ratio. It means 
that firms with low market to book ratio tend to had significantly higher leverage (Lang, 
Ofek and Stulz, 1996). The significant positive relation between debt to assets support the 
research of Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994), and Budiarso and Pontoh (2016) in contex of 
life cycle theory. 
The ratio of debt to assets has a significant positive effects in the dividend payment. Rozeff 
(1982) suggests that the lower payout ratios in firms that have greater growth 
opportunities with the intention of saving fund to finance growth.  Thus the higher 
dividend payout indicate that firms used lower debt, because they have less investment 
opportunities, have sufficient fund and do not need external financing. These firms have 
tendency to use dividend payment as a mechanisme for controling managers selfish 
behaviour (Jensen, 1986). These results are in line with the interpretation of free cash 
flow theory, that debt as a tool to control managers from the selfish behaviours, in being 
use substantial free cash flow in low return project or waste. This result supporting the 
work by Jensen (1986), Easterbrook, (1984), Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994), and 
Thanatawee, (2011),  
Furthermore, Table 2 provides results that the increase in debt is follow with the increase 
total assets and earnings performance, it can be assume  that firms use debt to finance 
investment and depend more on the internal financing for their operating and investing 
activities. 
The results from logit regression show that among explanatory variables are significant 
determinants of dividend payment. Moreover, the positive sign of size, return on assets 
and debt to assets ratio, indicate that managers have incentives to grow the firms beyond 
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the optimal size, in doing so, managers power increase concern the resources under their 
control (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, Eisenhardt, (1989) suggests that management have 
special role, as decision making, rationaly will assessments of ex post deviations of the 
contracts because it will effect through the manager’s wage, therefore, it indicate that 
managers follow the behavior oriented contract (e.g. salaries and hierarchical 
governance). Furthermore, Aivazian and Cleary, (2003) suggest that the higher debt to 
assets ratio due to greater reliance on bank debt. Hill and Jones (1992) suggest that  
because shareholders cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately, there for , 
they use  the higher debt to limit the opportunistic action by managers control the 
managers power of resources. Also, indicate that shareholders is buying managers 
behaviour and transfer risk to the managers (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
4.2. Firm as non dividend payers 
The results from logit regressions in table 4 shows that size, return on assets, retained 
earnings to total assets and debt to total assets are negatively significant, while those on 
price to book value are positive significantly. These findings suggest that firms with 
small size, lower profitability, lower retained earnings to total assets, lower debt to total 
assets and higher price to book value tend to pay higher dividend. These results are not 
in line with life cycle theory, this theory suggest that dividend tend to be paid by mature 
firms because they have higher profitability and fewer attractive investment 
opportunities (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2006). These firms tend to less ability in 
generate profit, dont use externaly fund but they pay dividend. Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan, (2002) suggest that if the good news in dividend increase is associated 
with cash flows and systematic risk, moreover increase dividends experience a 
significant decline in return on assets.  
The negative coefficient for size and positive coefficient for price to book value are not 
in line with free cash flow theory. It suggest that self interested managers lead to drive 
the managers to expand firms bigger than the optimal size because the larger the firms 
the more resources under managers control and it is also associated with increase in 
managers compensation  (Jensen, 1986).  Furthermore, this theory suggests that 
dividend can be a mechanisme to mitigate the selfish behavior of managers associated 
with excess fund. The positive coefficient of price to book value is not in line with the 
free cash flow theory as suggest by Jensen, (1986), Easterbrook, (1984),  Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976). Thus, this result not in line with the study of Jensen (1986), that 
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suggest debt can be an effective subtitute for dividends and a mechanism to mitigate 
agency problems.  
5. CONCLUSION  
Firms as dividend payers have tendency to follow life cycle theory, thus, the optimal 
dividend payment  depends on the firms phase in its life cycle. This study provides the 
evidence that firms dividend payers are firms in mature stage because at this level they 
have higher profitability, higher earnings, and lower or shrink investment opportunities 
which make them are tend to pay dividend.  
The dividend payers tend to follow the free cash flow theory as indicate by size, return on 
assets, retained earnings to total assets, debt to assets ratio price to book value. The 
agency problems in dividend payers are associated with excess fund and control over 
resources by managers opportunisme, the mechanisme to aleviate this problem firms use 
higher dividend to limited the excess fund from project with negative net present value, 
while debt used as internal monitoring to managers behavior. The dividend payers tend 
to follow the life cycle theory, as a mature firms high cash flows, lower investment 
opportunities. While non dividend payers are not in line with life cycle, which small size, 
less profitability, lower earnings, lower debt and high investment opportunities. Also, non 
dividend payers are not in line with free cash flow theory, because they dont have excess 
fund thus, agency problem with free cash flow does not exist. 
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